and the institution itself displayed little in the way of 'philosophical flair' in either considering the practice of reconciliation or resisting 'the legitimacy and identity politics that cut against inquiry into the concept's complex roots' (Doxtader 2012 :28) . As a result, high profile processes like the TRC have fostered the idea reconciliation as a widely-regarded normative good, deployed by a range of activists and civil society organisations to support their claims (Little 2014 :92) , but with little in the way of analytical capacity that might assist such actors to understand the performance of these policies and processes (Renner 2012 :51) .
Much research has attempted to further narrow and define the concept of reconciliation in an effort to 'boil it down' to an agreed policy framework (Renner 2012 :55) . As Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin suggest (2007: 4) , however, the immediate appeal and widespread promotion of reconciliation has led to the neglect of key questions, with scant attention being paid to either the specifics or complexities of the paradigm with regard to the way it invokes a range of challenges associated with societies in transition, 'such as the possibility of justice after "radical evil," the redistribution of wealth, the creation of civil society, and the relevance of the past to the present and the future, among numerous others.' Further, as some of the promise of post-conflict efforts in South Africa and elsewhere has faded in light of ongoing struggles and challenges, a more critical perspective on the meaning and possibility of reconciliation has emerged (Little 2014 :92) . These debates continue, offering divergent and contradictory understandings of the concept. Nevertheless, Andrew Schaap contends that there are advantages to this conceptual ambiguity, as by 'accommodating multiple meanings' the idea of reconciliation 'provides a common vocabulary within which citizens may contest the terms and possibilities of their political association' (Schaap 2005 :13) . The alternative -pursuing a definitional consensus -would have the effect of 'policing the boundaries' of reconciliation discourse', thereby limiting 'what we can hear.' Rather, it seems important to focus on 'the way in which the language of reconciliation can frame the space in which debates about conflict transformation can take place' (Little 2012a :84) .The following section draws on one strand of political theorising about reconciliation to develop a framing of the concept that draws on agonistic democracy theory.
Conflictual reconciliation
Much of the reconciliation literature continues to focus on the normative ambition of achieving 'communitarian social harmony' (Hirsch 2012 :1) . In contrast, a fully political understanding of reconciliation recognises the futility of attempting to transcend conflict in this way, instead framing reconciliation as 'a potentially agonistic clash of world views within the context of a community that is "not yet"' (Schaap 2005 :4) . In Andrew Schaap's view, a 'politically adequate conception of reconciliation' would be alive to the inherent risk of politics, that is, 'that community is not inevitable and that conflict may turn out to be irreconcilable': …if the ideal of reconciliation is to open up a space for politics between former enemies rather than cover over the conflicts that threaten their political association, reconciliation should be kept in view for being a potentiality of action in the present, which depends upon accepting the risk of politics (and the opportunity it presents) rather than eliding it (Schaap 2005 :21-2) . This is a profoundly pragmatic approach to conflict, which contests a normative aspiration to 'peace', instead recognising that a more realistic normative context, in which conflict is managed and potentially transformed, 'is one where there is a disorderly mixture of peace and conflict and where democratic politics co-exists with other forms of political expression' (Little 2014 :138) . Further, such an approach foregrounds the fact that in assuming that conflict is reconcilable, in the sense of achieving harmony and consensus, the politics of reconciliation become obscured (Schaap 2004 :524 ). An agonistic approach, by contrast, holds out the hope that, in spaces of irresolvable conflict, divided societies will expand their political capacities, embrace conflict without violence, and find new ways of respecting old adversaries.
A conflictual approach to reconciliation recognises that in many deeply divided societies, the capacity to 'disagree respectfully' may be the most that can be expected from conflict transformation efforts. (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :238) . Conflict is, of course, ubiquitous. It has shaped, and continues to shape, all societies, not just those emerging from violent struggles, although it may be a more obvious structuring factor in deeply divided societies (Little 2014 :5, 11 ). Conflict does not necessarily cause violence, and conflict and violence should not be conflated (Mitchell 2011 :24) although they too often are. As a political dynamic, conflict derives from, and is inherent to, all social institutions, including in 'economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organisation' (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011 : 7) . Thus, while the desire to end or resolve conflict is common to many views of reconciliation and peacebuilding, this article instead contends that this is both unrealistic and undesirable. Instead, nonviolent conflict is here conceived as a social good, or at least as potentially a social good, but one that requires institutional interventions if it is to harness its democratic potential rather than devolve into violence. The challenge, according to Charles VillaVicencio (2009 :62) is 'to develop ways of engagement that allow for nonconformity, dissent, open debate, and orderly political change when necessary.' This approach to social and political conflict takes seriously the insights of agonistic democracy theory to conceive of processes of reconciliation and conflict transformation as deeply political and involving ongoing non-violent conflict.
Agonism can be understood as 'a technique for managing conflict' that recognises the fluid nature of political conflict and the resulting need for political responses that are context specific rather than attempts at a universal model (Little 2014 :7) . Agonistic democrats affirm the central place of conflict in any democratic politics, a view that reflects the agonists' concern that anything resembling consensus 'too often become a way of coopting radical challenges to the dominant interests within a society' (Schaap 2006 :257) . Agonists instead foreground the inherent struggles that are constitutive of political life, promoting an ideal of democracy that is marked by an 'epistemic openness' to difference and conflicting points of view (Chakravarti 2012 :11) . This understanding of political life has particular resonance for societies engaged in a politics of reconciliation, where the need to open -and to keep open -political spaces in which divided and opposing groups can engage is crucial. Conflict is thus understood not as a negative dynamic in reconciliation processes, but as an essential and ever-present political dynamic that allows opposing groups in divided societies to engage in passionate democratic contestation about their future ways of living together. Indeed, Paul Muldoon and Andrew Schaap contend that reconciliation processes are inevitably agonistic in nature precisely because they 'open up a space of contestation and disagreement' between opposing groups focused on claims and counter-claims about past wrongs (Muldoon and Schaap 2012 :182) . Thus, rather than bracketing or avoiding conflict, the aim of an agonistic reconciliatory engagement is to 'transform actually or potentially violent conflict into non-violent forms of social struggle and social change' (Ramsbotham 2010 :53) . As Ed Wingenbach (2011 :61) has suggested, agonistic engagements provide 'an outlet for passion and dissent' that may in fact make the eruption of violent, antagonistic relations less likely.
Andrew Schaap (2006 :258) has argued that an agonistic approach to reconciliation and conflict transformation is important because it foregrounds what is at stake in the politics of these processes. Schaap contends that less critical accounts of reconciliation that emphasise ideas of 'settling accounts', 'healing nations' and 'restoring community' start from the presumption that unity is an unquestioned social good, thereby depoliticizing the terms in which the unity of the polity is constructed and represented. Indeed, as Paul Muldoon has suggested, an agonistic perspective 'makes it possible to understand how reconciliation ever comes onto the political agenda.' This does not happen because there is sudden agreement about past wrongs, but because marginalized groups politicise those past actions by renaming them as injustices (Muldoon 2008 :127) . One well-known formulation of agonism, advanced by leading theorist Chantal Mouffe (2007; 2005; 2000) , asserts that the primary task of democracy is to convert antagonism into agonism and enemies into adversaries or, as William Connolly (1991 :x) puts it, to 'cultivate agonistic respect between interlocking and contending constituencies'. This, as Mouffe suggests, has consequences for how we imagine politics and the nature of the public sphere. Rather than eliminating passions, or attempting to contain them in the private sphere to better support a consensus, these passions can be 'mobilised' towards 'the promotion of democratic designs.' In this way, consensus can be seen as a result of a temporary stabilization of power -the kind of stabilization often pursued in divided societiesthat inevitably entails some form of exclusion (Mouffe 2007 :43) . In an agonistic mode of reconciliation, such stabilisations of power may be acknowledged as sometimes necessary, but always to be resisted. Democracy is envisioned as a 'continual contest among incompatible visions, identities, and projects' in which no view can dominate or assume hegemonic status for very long (Wingenbach 2011 :21) .
Adrian Little points to the normative dimension in these formulations of agonism, suggesting that theorists such as Mouffe attempt to 'domesticate' political conflict by 'broadening the spectrum of acceptability in the analytical framing of particular issues' (Little 2014 :75) . In this view, although agonists resist the reconciliatory drive to fabricate social and political consensus, and emphatically do not want to deligitimise disagreement, they do see the potential for politics to more effectively accommodate difference based on the nature of the interaction between conflictual actors (Little 2014 :75) . In my view, this normative agonistic desire to foreground and yet domesticate conflict is no bad thing. An approach to reconciliation that recognises the central place of conflict is not without risks. As Charles Villa-Vicencio contends:
The complexities and dangers inherent to this process are huge. On the one hand this could result in a clash of interests that, if left unmanaged, might undermine the political climate needed to build a new political dispensation. On the other hand, the essence of the demands made by the different sectors of society could be so restrained and diluted that the political process would be undermined to the point that in the interests of compromise and consensus, critique would be closed down. The outcome would be a society built on soft mediocrity and compliance that would fail to provide the space and social structures through which people could give expression to their needs and promote their interests (Villa-Vicencio
:43)
The challenge, according to Villa-Vicencio, is to 'build a national consensus' while still 'encouraging a level of debate' about longer term ideals (Villa-Vicencio 2009 :43) . From an agonistic perspective however, this recourse to 'national consensus' as the pathway through this challenging terrain is inadequate. What is required is the creation of spaces for agonistic engagement across all socio-political levels.
Multi-level conflict transformation
Empirically this article now proceeds to apply this conceptual approach to a framework that examines conflict transformation across three interlinked sociopolitical levels: the constitutional, the institutional, and the relational. Reconciliation efforts are here understood as a mode of political engagement and agonistic struggle across these three porous, overlapping and interlinked socio-political domains. This approach builds on earlier work in the field that drew attention to the complex dynamics and processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding, taking research well beyond a concern with elite agreement-making or models of a liberal peace, towards concern with local actors and the opening up of participatory political spaces (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011 :233-4) . The framework of multi-level conflict transformation suggests that reconciliation and conflict transformation are far
more complex and open-ended processes than is sometimes acknowledged, involving a diverse cluster of practices that, according to Schaap (2005 :12) include (among others) 'repenting, restoring, punishing, apologising, repairing, forgiving, redeeming, forgetting, remembering, promising and understanding.' To these I would add recognising and redistributing, along the lines formulated by Nancy Fraser (1997) .
This approach also drives an understanding of the Janus-faced requirements of political reconciliation, paying attention to social structures as well as psychologies, and encouraging the development of a shared vision that is broad enough to achieve change without demanding either agreement about the past or a singular, shared identity (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :187) . This is not the first analysis to suggest that reconciliation and conflict transformation take place across several socio-political levels. Charles Villa-Vicencio (2004 :5) , for example, describes reconciliation as a process of 'building relations' across 'neighbourhoods, communities, and the nation.' Similarly, Arie Nadler contends that reconciliation requires structural, relational and identity-based transformation as a response to the 'multicausal nature of intergroup conflict' (Nadler 2012 :293) . Ernesto Verdeja (2009 :3-4) describes reconciliation as a 'complex, multileveled process' that proceeds across the levels of political society, civil society, institutions and individuals, in a manner Verdeja describes as 'disjunctured and uneven' (emphasis in the original), and which directs attention to 'the myriad ways in which reconciliatory efforts are manifested and develop.' (Verdeja 2009 :3) . This recognition of the multileveled requirements of reconciliation efforts is not surprising given the complex, multifaceted nature of preceding periods of struggle, oppression and injustice. As Daly and Sarkin contend, these histories often mean that for many societies attempting to reckon with the past, it can be virtually impossible to 'figure out which wrongs can or must be righted and how to go about righting them' (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :170) . A multi-level framework such as the one outlined below at least provides an outline of the multiple spaces in which reconciliatory and transformative efforts must be directed.
Constitutional reconciliation
Societies emerging from civil war, engaged in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, or still grappling with colonial and historical dispossession and injustice must all, in their own ways, confront the question of how they are constituted and in what ways they need to re-constitute themselves. The process of political reconciliation is driven by 'the hope of establishing a new beginning' that is 'selfconsciously enacted in the gap between past and future' (Schaap 2005 :91) . In contrast to a view of reconciliation that sees such a process initiated by a public acknowledgment of past wrongs, this view of political reconciliation sees it initiated in the act of constitution itself, in which that public, the 'we' of the society, is in fact instantiated. As Schaap argues, 'the constitution of a space for politics makes possible a future collective remembrance' (Schaap 2007 :15) . Thus, the work of constitutionalism, in both its political and legal senses, provides a founding moment, a space for politics, which is inevitably a space for conflict and contestation. In the framework outlined here, the constitutional space for political reconciliation involves three elements: settlements and agreements, constitutional design and reform, and citizenship.
Firstly, while the architecture of an agreement or settlement is important, this alone will not predict the success of post-violent conflict transformation. Indeed, the ingrained nature of social and political conflict suggests that political agreements in isolation will rarely bring about substantive change (Little 2014) . Instead, a promising settlement may (re)constitute a nation by recognising and bridging conflicting interests within a normative framework that represents the diversity of values to be found among the wider, conflictual society (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011 :188) . Ideally, a newly crafted settlement for a previously divided or violent society will open spaces in which common ground can be recognised while protecting from further oppression the identities, cultures, and interests of diverse citizens.
However, a key factor at this level of analysis is the extent to which settlements and agreements are designed in ways that might transform or merely contain a conflict, how they might keep open or close off future political debate, and the wider cost to democratic participation when it is perceived that there is no viable political alternative to the agreement that is in place.
In spite of these aspirations towards openness, however, it is common for the drive to 'settle' a conflict, and bring an end to violence and repression, to result in consensusbased compromises that close down political space, with problematic long-term implications. For example, it is now generally accepted that many of the compromises reached in the years leading up to South Africa's negotiated settlement between the major parties (and the eventual transition to democracy in 1994) were thought crucial to the nation's future stability, and essential to avoiding a drawn out civil war. To move the negotiations forward the settlement between the African National Congress and the National Party came to rely on what was termed 'sufficient consensus' on the key issues of concern to both parties. Over time, however, it has become clear that in closing down spaces for further discussion about, for example, more radical economic restructuring, subduing important conflicts in favour of a desired consensus, South Africa, has in fact perpetuated deep social divisions. Further, rather than re-opening the terms of this settlement in light of considerable social unrest, South Africa seems intent on pursuing the neoliberal economic policies that underpinned the settlement.
The 2012 violence at the Marikana mine make clear that these unresolved issues may yet see a return to state-sponsored violence on a large scale, undoing the very peace the settlement was intended to bring about. To re-open the discussion about re/distribution in South Africa would, however, require a more agonistic approach to the engagement, a move away from the elite consensus that has seen a minority of influential South Africans benefit while the majority continues to suffer in extreme poverty. An agonistic approach would mean relinquishing the goal of short-term consensus or agreement, and embracing a more open ended, conflict-laden engagement.
Beyond settlement, once an agreement is in place a country attempting to re-constitute itself must develop a new political 'container' in which to govern itself. Often this will take the form of a new or radically revised legal constitution that will allow former enemies to develop ways of governing together. A new constitution can form part of a new national narrative, with the ambition of reflecting the experiences of the diversity of citizens, and protecting their individual and group rights and cultures, ensuring freedom from future oppression, and, most importantly, contributing to reconciliation through the creation of legal frameworks and institutions within which these ambitions may be realised by diminishing the gulf between the powerful and the powerless (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :216, 218) . But while Daly and Sarkin contend that a new government 'needs the strong backing of an emphatic constitution and its support systems if it is to subdue the tensions that people may feel towards one another' (Daly and Sarkin 2007:217) , an agonistic view of these constitutional requirements would maintain that an 'emphatic constitution' should not seek to subdue social tensions, but to create political space in which such tensions can be engaged and contested.
Again, however, the promise of constitutionalism has clear limits. Schaap argues that it is the very indeterminacy of community that creates a space for political reconciliation; a space that is closed down through the regulation of community required in a founding legal document. As he suggests, 'A legal constitution thus seems to be predicated on a necessary forgetting of the founding act that brings it into being, the moment of beginning which imparts an awareness of the frailty and contingency of community' (Schaap 2007 :24) . Instead, Schaap contends that in the immediate wake of civil war or the end of a repressive regime, the 'we' that is imagined in a constitution can only belong in an imagined democratic future (Schaap 2007 :26) . It does not become real, and is not settled, by the creation of a legal founding. Instead, according to Schaap, 'a legal constitution forecloses the opportunity to contest the terms within which such a relationship is determined' (Schaap 2007 :28) This caution about the political shortcomings inherent to the framing of a legal constitution can be applied to a range of settings, from a nation like South Africa, which famously embraced the opportunity to produce a new constitution, to a settler state such as Australia, which has struggled to reform its constitution to reflect its However, political reconciliation does not presuppose a prior community that requires restoration, but instead recognises the possibilities that may be revealed in political interactions between the many identity categories are invoked and contested (Schaap 2005 :84) -soldiers and ex-combatants, victims and survivors, indigenous and nonindigenous, leaders of the old regime and the new. The challenge for reconciliation is to create a nation and a national identity able to contain all the groups and the contests among and between them, 'not by forcing parties to move closer together but by providing a new conception of the state to which all parties are committed' (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :188) . Thus, in line with an agonistic view of political reconciliation, this level of analysis further challenges conflict transformation processes to retain the capacity to expand political spaces to enable the contestation and recontestation of ideas of belonging and citizenship. This concern is of particular relevance in historically divided societies like Australia, in which one or more group has experienced historical exclusion and marginalization. In these cases, as Bashir Bashir points out:
Historically excluded social groups are skeptical of any conception of democratic inclusion that requires them to set aside memories of oppression and exclusion, and to enter the political process simply as undifferentiated citizens subject to generic and universal concepts of deliberation and justice. Such ahistorical conceptions of democratic inclusion ignore or downplay the specific and defining experiences of oppressed social groups (Bashir 2012 :132) .
In most historically divided societies, these excluded and oppressed groups are still likely to experience marginalisation and discrimination in a range of social institutions.
Institutional reconciliation
The institutional level of the multi-level framework for conflict transformation, recognises that overcoming structural injustice will open spaces in which further transformation can occur (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011: 246) International evidence confirms, however, that these spaces of material and institutional transformation are also spaces of conflict within which a great deal is at stake. Conflicts over institutional transformation are imbued with political power imbalances characterised by the resistance of those who have benefited from previously repressive regimes to any change in the status quo. This is particularly the case with regard to the transformation of economic structures and institutions in order to build more equitable relations between former enemies, despite arguments suggesting that, without economic justice, reconciliation is without meaning (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :229) . Economic transformation may involve the redistribution of wealth, land reform, or the payment of reparations. These reforms are, however, often resisted by those who have previously enjoyed great wealth -despite the fact that continuing material deprivation is a persistent source of conflict that will impede reconciliation unless there is political space available through which to contest these inequities. As Daly and Sarkin contend, economic oppression 'conduces to exhaustion, frustration, and ultimately violence. Desperately poor people have neither the time, the energy, nor the hope to participate in programs designed to foster democracy, reconciliation, or justice' (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :228-9) . Structural, institutional reforms are most effective, they suggest, when sacrifice by those in privileged positions is recognised as being of common benefit as a contribution to reconciliation and greater social stability (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :237) . conflicts over land justice in Australia out of the public domain for the time being.
These conflicts are not, however, 'resolved', and are guaranteed to surface again at some future time to reclaim a place in Australian political reconciliation. In the meantime, however, the closing down of the nation's engagement over questions of land justice have further weakened relations of trust between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and non-Indigenous Australians.
Relational reconciliation
The last level of analysis in this framework is the relational level, which concerns the Scholars from a range of disciplines have stressed the importance of focusing on the underlying psychological and sociological needs that animate conflictual relations, including needs for recognition, acceptance, respect, security, and justice (Tropp 2012 :4) . It is in practices of relational engagement that attempt to address these needs that we can most clearly see the requirements for agonistic processes able to support difficult, ongoing conversations about the past: conversations about truth and justice, about forgiveness, about identity, and about learning to live together without violence.
One key aspect of relational engagement concerns a community's understanding of the past. Violent conflicts, of course, produce more than social division. Although many high profile commission have established themselves with the goal of seeking a singular 'truth', war and violence in fact produce different histories; different understandings of the past that can become the most contested aspect of any reconciliation process. As Brenna Bhandar (2007 :95) argues, many versions of reconciliation maintain a demand for one version of historical truth to be agreed in order for society to agree to restitution and move on. The reality, she contends, is that history is 'a compilation of different threads of memory, threads that are intertwined but also in conflict', meaning that the idea of a single, shared truth about the past is 'nothing more than a fiction.' An agonistic approach suggests that there will never be consensus on the past, there will always be multiple truths, multiple histories, that must somehow coexist.
An appreciation of this more contentious reality about the conflicting threads of history reveals much of what is at stake when reconciliation turns to consider the past.
In Northern Ireland, for example, an inability to contend with this reality has stymied the political capacity to attend to questions of history and memory in any formalised way for fear that it will merely be a polarising process. The understandable desire to end the violence and create greater social stability led to an avoidance of the contentious issue of historical responsibility in the deliberations that produced the 'fault neutral' framework of the Belfast Agreement (Aiken 2010 :175) . Thus, despite the fact that a formalised 'peace' has been in place since 1998, bolstered by the To engage with these concerns in a process of conflictual reconciliation will require a form of relational engagement that is intentionally agonistic. Dialogical engagement can, and does, take many forms including community relations work, story telling, single identity work, intra-community work and so on. This type of engagement is a form of political intervention designed to draw opposing groups into a process of listening to one another that can of itself function to expand political space. Many scholars note the importance of these micro level engagements to wider processes of conflict transformation as they create space for 'the voices of the oppressed' to be heard, in all their anger and pain, which is considered necessary 'if the politics of reconciliation is to avoid prejudging the very issues in dispute' (Bashir 2012 :139 is hoped that the capacity to share understanding about this world might become possible (Schaap 2005 :84) . Designed within an agonistic framework, the goal of such processes is to expand understanding of other perspectives, increasing the social and political capacity for difference to coexist and inform a non-violent democracy.
Conclusion
In the wake of violence, societies attempting to transform violent conflict from annihilation to engagement must confront a plethora of demands, across multiple levels of society, some of which risk reopening old wounds or disrupting a fragile peace. The challenges involved in these processes are immense, but in most societies emerging from violent conflict there is also to be found considerable energy and enthusiasm being directed towards these efforts. In post-violent conflict societies around the globe it is possible to observe political actors of all kinds prepared to engage in a politics of reconciliation across the multiple socio-political levels outlined here, with all the risks and complexities that this implies. Thus, to return to the question framing this article: Can we reconcile? My answer is yes, but only if we rethink the concept of reconciliation itself, and understand it as a complex, multilevel, process of constitutional, institutional and relational transformation, in which conflict will always be present, and has potential to be both creative and democratic.
An understanding of these challenges may help defray the frustration experienced by actors on the ground, who infrequently experience political reconciliation as 'success.'
The framework that that this article has mapped out makes clear that the process of transforming conflict is indeed challenging. It is not just multi-level, it is likely also multi-generational, engaging the temporal dimensions that Adrian Little addresses in his article in this issue. It is rarely linear, and the levels themselves are porous and overlapping. Reconciliation may not be able to meet all of these demands, either in the short or the long term; there may be no end to human efforts to right past wrongs.
These limitations should not, however, 'excuse inaction, naïve idealism, or undue delay' (Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader 2004 :ix) . Crucially, these efforts at reconciliation will not, and should not, do away with conflict, but instead retain a focus on harnessing conflict's powerful, democratic potential. As Charles VillaVicencio argues:
Never easy, reconciliation does not presuppose agreement on all solutions to all such issues. It does presuppose a willingness to address these concerns politically rather than in blood. This requires a willingness to think new thoughts and imagine new solutions (VillaVicencio 2009 :155).
The approach to reconciliation suggested here acknowledges that meaningful conflict transformation requires patience, persistence, creativity, risk, tolerance of conflict, and substantial government backing and investment over a long period of time. As a process, reconciliation will not 'end with a flourish', but it may be hoped that over time a political emphasis on reconciliation may give way to 'the day-to-day stuff of normal politics' (Daly and Sarkin 2007 :254) . Caution is needed however. Even a country like Australia, where it might be said that day-to-day politics now takes precedence over the politics of reconciliation, cannot be said to 'be reconciled'. There have been many moments in which Australians have sought to put the process of reconciliation in the past, most recently on the occasion of the 2008 Apology to the Stolen Generations. 2 As Schaap reminds us however, political reconciliation is forever confronted by the risk of politics, as 'the will to forgive is confronted by the prospect of the unforgiveable', such that the new beginning we believe we have created does not come to pass, and old hurt and divisions come back to the fore (Schaap 2005 :151) . Thus a nation may find itself engaged in the politics of reconciliation once more, perhaps at a different level -in Australia the register has shifted from apology to constitutional reform -often avoiding the underlying institutional transformations that would address historical disadvantage and dispossession, in the name of contemporary economic prosperity. These contests, this ever-conflictual 2 Coined by historian Peter Read in the 1980s, the term 'stolen generation' has, according to Robert Manne, taken on a similar significance for Indigenous Australians as the term 'the Holocaust' has for Jews (Manne 2001: 82) . 
